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Topic Characteristics: 
My thesis is going to focus on the creation of central banks, and whether they are 
created due to politically motivated factors or if the mainstream views that free banking failed, 
and thus for required the state to create a currency and ensure a monopoly.  
Currently, the mainstream view remains that central banks were created out of 
economic necessity, which would generally help to reduce transaction costs, prevent bank 
runs, and ensure that markets have a stable currency. Many of these statements in the 
recent financial crisis have begged questions on whether central banks are nothing more 
than political tools, rather than accountable and proper institutions that serve the market 
place. 
 To verify this issue, I plan on looking at historical periods, in the United States, 
Scotland, Australia, Sweden and Switzerland, which had a free banking era, and to verify 
their bond yields on government debt, before and after the transition. I will follow this with an 
expanded outlook at the central bank acts, which followed. And then I will conclude with 
looking at periods of financial stability/instability during the free banking era.   
My goal is to see if there is a strong link between political motivations for nation 
planning, through verifying the yield of government bonds between both periods, as to 
establish whether governments wanted to push yields to a lower level, and thus finance large 
government programs. I also plan on gaining insight through the central banks acts which are 
prone to guidelines and reasoning, and whether there was any real motivation for the central 
banks, which resonated in the acts. And to finalize, by verifying if the economic necessity 
was truly the case, with understanding if the case that bank runs and other economic 
downturns were prevalent under the free banking system. The length of my data will fall upon 
diverse historical records of bonds yields, the central bank acts and historical texts focusing 
on the free banking era. 
 
Working hypotheses: 
1. Hypothesis #1: Central Banks were created for engaging in nation building, through 
using the central bank as a method to reduce bond yields and make it easier to 
finance spending. 
2. Hypothesis #2: Central Bank Acts have no extensive reasoning for why central banks 
should be implemented. 
3. Hypothesis #3: Free banking did not lead to economic instability 
4. Other hypotheses: 
The expected title of your thesis: Central Banking: Political opportunism or economic 
necessity 
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Methodology: 
Concerning the bond yields data, I will use a historical approach through gathering 
documentation on historical bonds yields from the diverse case studies I plan to analyze, in 
which I will compare those yields with modern yields and attempt to see if there is a positive 
or negative correlation between increased government spending and central banking era 
bond yields. I plan on acquiring the data from numerous books, but also from academic 
articles which have acquired a historical overview. Many of the modern data, I will be able to 
acquire from either statistical services or central banks from all my case studies. In analyzing 
the central bank acts of the countries in my case studies, I will look at the central bank acts, 
and I will acquire them through access to the diverse parliamentary websites. I plan to further 
verify the free banking era through a historical perspective, by analyzing a combination of 
books and academic articles from Lawrence H. White, followed by other academic articles 
that elaborated on the free banking era. I will rely mostly on historical research gathering and 
document analyses. I will also include case studies, which will include the United States, 
Scotland, Australia, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
Outline: 
1.Introduction 
2.Theoretical backgroud and the review of world literature 
3.Government Bond Yields (Free-Baking era vs. Central Banking era) 






4.Central Bank Acts 






5. Free Banking era stability of financial markets (bank runs & currency crises) 








7. Potential Bibliography/References 
 
Caplan, B. (2006). The Myth Of The Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies. 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Congdon, T. (2009). Central Banking in a Free Society. London, Great Britain: The Institute 
of Economic Affairs. 
4 | P a g e  
 
Cukierman, A., & Webb, S. B. (n.d.). Political Influence on the Central Bank: International 
Evidence. The World Bank Economic Review, 9(3), 397-423. 
Dowd, K. (2002). The Experience of Free Banking. (K. Dowd, Ed.) Routledge . 
Epstein, G. (2007). Central banks as agents of employment creation. United Nations, 
Department of Economics and Social Affairs. 
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/unewpaper/38.htm. 
Essars, P. D., Raffalovich, A., & Walker, B. E. (1896). A History of Banking in all the Leading 
Nations (Vol. 3). (J. o. Bulletin, Ed.) New York: Journal of Commerce and Commercial 
Bulletin. 
Goodhart, C. (1988). The Evolution of Central Banks. MIT Press. 
Hayek, F. A. (1990). Denationalisation of Money: The Argument Refined (3rd ed.). London, 
United Kingdom: The Institute of Economic Affairs. 
Hayek, F. A. (2009). Individualism and Economic Order. Ludwig von Mises Institute. 
Keynes, J. M. (1936). The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Cambridge 
University Press. 
MacLeod, H. D., Horn, A. E., & Townsend, J. P. (1896). A History of Banking in all the 
Leading Nations (Vol. 2). (T. J. Bulletin, Ed.) New York: The Journal of Commerce 
and Commercial Bulletin. 
Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1998). The Communist Manifesto. Signet Classics. 
Selgin, G. A. (1988). The Theory of Free Banking: Money Supply under Competitive Note 
Issue. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Sherif, K., Borish, M., & Gross, A. (2003). State-Owned Banks in the Transition: Origins, 
Evolution, and Policy Responses. World Bank Publications. 
Smith, V. C. (1990). The Rationale of Central Banking and the Free Banking Alternative. 
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. 
Sumner, W. G. (1896). A History of Banking in all the Leading Nations (Vol. 1). (T. J. Bulletin, 
Ed.) New York: The Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin. 
White, L. H. (1999). The Theory of Monetary Institutions. Wiley-Blackwell. 
White, L. H. (2008). Free Banking in Britain: Theory, Experience and Debate, 1800-1845 
(2nd ed.). London, Great Britain: The Institute of Economic Affairs. 
Wirth, M., Borght, R. v., Jensen, A., & Jernigan, T. R. (1896). A History of Banking in all the 
Leading Nations (Vol. 4). (T. J. Bulletin, Ed.) New York: The Journal of Commerce 
and Commercial Bulletin. 
 
 








I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work, based on the sources and literature listed in the 




Justin M. Donelle       Prague, May 18th, 2012 

















6 | P a g e  
 
Contents 
Master Thesis Proposal ...................................................................................................................2 
DECLARATION: ....................................................................................................................................5 
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................8 
2. Theoretical Background ................................................................................................................ 12 
2.1. Marxist School ....................................................................................................................... 13 
2.2. Chartalist School .................................................................................................................... 15 
2.3. Neo-Mercantilist School ......................................................................................................... 17 
2.4. Mainstream Pragmatism ......................................................................................................... 19 
2.4.1. Monetarism ..................................................................................................................... 20 
2.4.2. Inflation Targeting ........................................................................................................... 21 
2.5. Free Banking School .............................................................................................................. 24 
3.0 Historical Bond Yield Analysis ................................................................................................... 27 
3.1 Australia ................................................................................................................................. 27 
3.2 Sweden ................................................................................................................................... 31 
3.3 Switzerland ............................................................................................................................. 34 
3.4 United States ........................................................................................................................... 37 
4.0 Central Banking Legislation ........................................................................................................ 40 
4.1 Australian Reserve Bank Act ................................................................................................... 40 
4.2 Swedish Sveriges Riksbank Act .............................................................................................. 42 
4.3 Swiss National Bank Law ........................................................................................................ 43 
4.4 United States Federal Reserve Act ........................................................................................... 45 
4.5 Scotland and the Bank of England ........................................................................................... 48 
5.0 Financial and Economic Stability ................................................................................................ 50 
5.1 Australia ................................................................................................................................. 50 
5.2 Sweden ................................................................................................................................... 52 
5.3 Switzerland ............................................................................................................................. 53 
5.4 United States ........................................................................................................................... 54 
5.5 Scotland .................................................................................................................................. 56 
6.0 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 57 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................ 61 
Abstraktní ......................................................................................................................................... 62 
Bibliography...................................................................................................................................... 63 
 
7 | P a g e  
 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Long-term Australian Government Bond Yields .................................................... 29 
Figure 2: Short-Run Swedish Government Bond Yields: 1856-2006 ..................................... 31 
Figure 3: Swedish Government Debt: 1719-2003.................................................................. 33 
Figure 4: Swiss Private Banks Lending Discount Rate: 1838-1893 ....................................... 35 
Figure 5: Switzerland's Public Debt: 1880-1913 ................................................................... 36 
Figure 6: United States' Government Bond Yields: 1830-1989 ............................................. 38 












8 | P a g e  
 
1. Introduction 
Political Science is a complex field. Not only is the discipline constantly influenced by 
people who have political agendas but nonetheless, political science should be conducted in 
an environment of changing minds. The political scientist must always conduct himself in a 
manner that challenges all aspects of society, by looking at the process of institutional 
creations by governments. The political scientist must have an open mind, and critically 
evaluate the motives and reasoning behind actions taken by politicians, and institutions. The 
political scientist must go to the furthest ends in attempting to solve policy problems, but to 
also acknowledge the need to understand profoundly economic theory, as it serves as the 
foundations for financing and shaping our current society. Without taking this diverse method 
to analyze society, political scientists will neglect the problems that face our society, and 
simply focus on utopian goals, which cannot be reached with theory alone and the belief of all 
beings being graceful and holly. 
At the same time, economists must ensure to continuously increase their 
interpretations of government actions, and not simply accept government institutions as the 
ultimate solution to all problems. Economists must take into greater consideration the 
evolution of institutions and diverse laws or government monopolies, and not simply 
challenge the conventional view for a minority, but must look at all institutions and the 
political motivations behind their creation, to bridge a greater understanding on whether they 
were politically motivated or economically necessary. 
This is essential in the current climate of great instability, with the world entering a 
period of slowdown, the United States saddled with a mountain of debt, and the European 
Union‟s project of a common currency, the euro, being proven to be the greatest blunder in 
modern history. The root of the cause in many ways is attributed to too much debt, but yet, 
that is what our current monetary system does encourage, whether through inflation targeting 
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or any other mean. Despite this criticism, and the multiple counter-arguments, it remains open 
to the real view of whether our current monetary system is unsustainable. As political 
scientists either blame a lack of government regulation, or the failure of capitalism, they seem 
to neglect the most basic analysis of business cycle theories. As well, they seem to lack the 
knowledge of how the central banks of today were created, and why the government needed a 
monopoly over a countries currency. Both of these neglects remain the real deficit in the field 
of political science. 
My opinion remains that this problem has arisen from a drastic function of group 
analysis, and has lacked the focus of studying institutions and their impacts on citizens in 
economic terms. Too often, in political science it is easier to simply debate policies and group 
economic policy as a factor, and not understand what factors actually exist, or the normative 
actions of multiple individuals. Or in the terms of government monopolies, political scientists 
have tended to view them favourably, by either being employed by such institutions, or their 
source of knowledge, and reason to continue teaching or giving analysis. This basic analysis 
of the profession should constitute encouragement to tackle further issues. As Hayek 
famously said,” The first need is to free ourselves of that worst form of contemporary 
obscurantism which tries to persuade us that what we have done in the recent past was all 
either wise or inevitable. We shall not grow wiser before we learn that much that we have 
done was very foolish” (Hayek, 1944, p.237). Hayek‟s point forms a great basis for 
understanding that in reality, many institutions and motives have been overlooked by political 
scientists and economists, and simply accepted as natural evolution of society. 
In tackling this subject, one of the oldest and most profound institution that has rarely 
received any “mainstream” question among both political scientists and economists, is that of 
the government‟s monopoly on currency. Whether it be through the helm of the finance 
department‟s power to issue notes as it sees fit, or the modern central banks which attempt to 
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seem independent, despite being rather politicized themselves as actors in society. As it must 
be noted, that some individuals have attempted to dismiss the need of a central bank, based on 
comparing currency to other goods and services, in which it would be possible to allow 
competition, as described in Hayek (1976).  A further look at the historical aspects of stability 
was taken into consideration through multiple case studies by multiple economists such as 
Lawrence H. White, Steven Horwitz, Daniel Klein, and others. As while this great interest, it 
is astonishing that political scientists have not followed suit, and have instead simply focused 
on analyzing the independence of central banking policies from the arm of government. In 
spite of this lack of interest in analyzing the origins of central banks, looking at the 
motivations from politicians and their connection to the monopoly over money is exactly 
what I am going to do in this text. The aim of this research is to give an answer to the 
following three primary questions: 
1. Has the monopoly over currencies been created for engaging in nation building? 
2. Is there strong concrete reasoning behind the reason for implementing central 
banks, in the central banks‟ legislation? 
3. Did the periods of free banking lead to such a drastic amount of economic 
instability, that a government monopoly was required? 
At this point, the reader may still be in doubt about the relevance of studying the 
motivations behind the creation of central banks, by politicians. I therefore must express my 
own motivations for looking at this occurrence of a previous time. As social scientists, we are 
often kept interested in the present and ever continuing series of events, and natural evolution 
of society. It is this which is often exposed to being about solving issues that arise 
immediately and the most compassionately, while not taking into consideration the history of 
political legislature‟s actions, which could reveal many truths that have been buried upon in 
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previous legislatures and systems of government. Frankly, we cannot simply reject previous 
developments and assume that they were an evolutionary approach, we must view alternative 
theories and reasoning for the problems we witness every day. 
The current financial crisis which plagues Europe and the United States have chocked 
the world in many respects, while creating large social strains and instability. Leading 
economists to call for unconventional views, such as buying  large quantities of debt from the 
housing market, to excessively buying government bonds in order to reduce the interest that 
diverse countries must pay, such as in Spain or Greece. The “mainstream” approach to central 
banking has been interpreted by economists as being a natural institution that should ensure 
the convertibility of banknotes, and ensuring that a society could have a universal accounting 
system for economic transactions, while holding that bank runs would be an essential danger, 
as well.  
Central banks can be a rather difficult issue to trace due to the lack of historical 
records from legislatures dating back, sometimes from hundreds of years. Despite this issue, it 
does none the less require the most available and probable data to be studied in detail. To 
achieve this research, firstly, I will analyze the theoretical background surrounding the 
reasoning given for the creation of modern central banks, or the better understanding for why 
a state would desire to have a monopoly over a currency. To make it a more solid and 
comparative analysis, I will use case studies from countries that experienced a free banking 
period sometime through their history, most notably the United States, Scotland, Australia, 
Sweden, and Switzerland. Secondly, I will analyze the yields on government bonds, in which 
I will make a comparison between the yields observed under the free banking era to those of 
the central banking era, and then I shall look for differences between both periods, and 
whether there was a motivation that could be in play to help lower bond yields. Thirdly, I will 
take a thorough analysis to the legislation surrounding central banks, and I will look at the 
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intentions given in the legislation as to whether there were clear reasons behind their creation. 
The expectation is to see that central banks were not simply created for the pure pleasure of 
politicians, and as to whether they can give rise to any ideas to foster the government or 
implement any strategies for society. Fourthly, I will take a historical analysis by looking at a 
comparison between the central banking era, and the free banking era, for sign of financial 
instability, bank runs, currency crises, and business cycles. The comparison will hopefully 
help to take a greater analysis as to whether the action of implementing central banks were 
correct, or more towards asking whether any of the concerns that modern economists argue, 
truly live up to their criticism of competing currencies. Verifying as to whether central banks 
should be rethought, and help to grow the interest of political scientists in targeting and 
evaluating these diverse institutions that they help to create. Finally, I will finish with a 
general conclusion on the entire motivations for the creation of central banks, and whether the 
legislation truly lived up to its desired intents. I hope that I may conclude with interesting 
answers which can help put a new face on whether there were any indications that creating 
central banks were simply based on political motivations, or if they were truly demonstrated 
to be economically necessary. 
2. Theoretical Background  
In this chapter the diverse views on the ownership of currencies will be analyzed, 
through the motivations and reasoning that have been given in favour of such arrangement. 
The purpose is to provide a background and current set of views that diverse scholars hold 
over the use, necessity, opposition to a currency monopoly. In the first section of this chapter, 
we will analyze the Marxist school and its revolutionary aspect. In the second section the 
chartalist school and its natural monopoly over money. In the third section the neo-
mercantilist school and its use for money as a tool for the state. In the fourth, the pragmatic 
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mainstream approach of accepting a monopoly and influencing its policy. And finally in the 
fifth section the free banking school and its rejection of a monopoly over currencies. 
2.1. Marxist School 
 The Marxist school has contributed to a substantive portion of political science 
literature with concerns to political economy. The Marxist school has normally contributed to 
constant class struggles, which it has criticized the “capitalist mode of production”. However 
the diverse differences that the Marxists point out, must be taken into consideration when 
understanding Marxist positions as their basic interpretation of class struggles and rejection of 
capitalism is based on the core difference of their economic understanding of human action, 
which is the theory of labour value. The theory is a theory which states that any commodity 
made, is only worth the amount of labour associated with producing or obtaining said 
commodity. The theory differentiates between the neoclassical view, which argues that the 
value of a product is determined by tastes, technology and endowments. A different argument 
among economists, however, it must always be considered when understanding Marxian 
positions. 
 When viewing Marxian theories on money, and state monopolies, the effective 
beginning remains in reviewing Karl Marx‟s original writings on the subject. Marx‟s 
interpretation of an optimum currency in many ways was glued to the understanding that 
paper-based money was nothing more than a fraudulent form of commodity, which had 
virtually no labour value placed on it (Marx, 1992, p.26). Marx argued that under the current 
system, prices were applied to commodities, such as gold which in the end would only lead to 
surplus value under the capitalist system (Marx, 1992, p.210). This explanation from Marx 
could be presented as an excellent case against monopolizing money, and instead supporting 
barter transactions, of simply trading one good for another. Since the labour would be applied 
by individuals to the items, and trade to them among others. 
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 Despite his objections to such type of system, he seemed to change his stance further 
in life. When arguing with the social democratic party of Germany. In his arguments against 
the party‟s recent policy platform, he argued that all people in society should receive a 
certificate from society, which would demonstrate how much amount of labour he has given 
to society in producing diverse items (Marx, 1999). This drastic change, most notably a 
“certificate from society”, is transformational, as it gives way for the creation of a fiat money 
system, which would be permitted to redistribute and ensure the exchange of goods and 
services, through the natural monopoly powers granted to the state, or as he viewed it more, 
that of society. This contrast shows an advancement in Marx‟s thinking, since in the 
Communist Manifesto, he wrote as one of the planks that, “Centralization of credit in the 
banks of the state, by means of national bank with state capital and an exclusive monopoly” 
(Marx, 2000, p.20). The elaboration seems to expand his call for centralization, not only of 
financial institutions such as banks and any investments funds; he called for a greater 
monopoly over credit. In which a monopoly over a currency or as he may prefer to call it 
otherwise, “certificate from society”. 
 As society advances, Marx viewed that capitalism would destroy itself, and a utopian 
socialist state would come about. Marx‟s understanding and motivations for such ethics, was 
for equality, but also to advance changes in social relations (Graziani, 1997, p.27). The 
constant revolutionary, and push towards a new system of egalitarianism, if it can be applied, 
would be the ultimate goal of Marx. Which such a revolution would happen through multiple 
changes in society, which having complete control over credit and a currency, or the financial 
system, it‟s clear that implementing a monopoly, or a modern central bank would go hand in 
hand with his objectives or having supreme control over all areas of the medium of exchange. 
15 | P a g e  
 
2.2. Chartalist School 
 The chartalist school was created out of the work of economist Georg Friedrich 
Knapp. The main theory of the school is based in the premise that money is clearly a 
government monopoly. The schools arguments largely began on the premise that legal history 
should be a for application of monetary policy, in which people would simply accept that by 
law, most notably tender laws,  is a socially recognised exchange-commodity (Knapp, 1924, 
p.2). Knapp‟s argument in favour is the essential demonstration to use the system more as one 
of following the will of government legislation. However, Knapp explained further that when 
exchanging commodities, one could exchange corn for silver, in which silver would become 
an exchange-commodity, or one could either exchange corn for other items such as meat 
(Knapp, 1924, p.3). In essence he leaves it open that barter or a system of exchange, such as 
money could be used, despite he keeps in thought that governments have a role to play in the 
currency markets. He explained the reason for defining into law, as being a “socially” 
recognized exchange-commodity (Knapp, 1924, p.4). This form of currency would therefore 
be socially accepted by the majority of individuals in society, for their accounting purposes, 
and help to put an end to barter, as expected would happen in the long-term. Despite his 
consideration for metal commodities as a possible means of exchange, he criticized the use of 
metals, since they could easily be used in producing diverse items (Knapp, 1924, p.30), for 
example a car or even metal roofing. This sets the stage for the state intervening and 
maintaining a certain level of control, by ensuring that a common accepted medium of 
exchange , as he described it as a “customary means of payment” (Knapp, 1924, p.10), which 
compared to gold or silver, was simply not possible, since individuals could define the metals 
as being possible to use for creating diverse items, instead of simply being an accounting-
style mean, to ensure that prices are properly reflected, not just on labour or value. He argued 
that under the previous system, value was the sole judgement, since there would always be an 
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issue when the state would change the tender laws to embrace silver, instead of copper or corn 
(Knapp, 1924, p.11).  This defined the chartalists‟ through defining the state as the necessary 
accountants. The issue of taxes comes into play when Knapp (pp.52, 1924) argued that the 
acceptability of money would be a key issue for any state to have, since it has the need to tax 
and fund services. The essence is that Knapp was truly the leader of the chartalist school, and 
left it to be further interpreted. 
 Moving forward to modern day, the tenet of Knapp‟s views has been augmented. As 
of today, the shift has come with Post-Keynesian economics, or more generally the strand of 
neo-chartalists‟, the rightful airs of Knapp. The central tenet of neo-chartalism is based on the 
premise that the government imposes a tax liabilities payable in its currency of issue (Febrero, 
2009, p.532). It is thus followed by the demand for the government‟s currency, as tax-payers 
offer goods and services for sale, asking for the currency in exchange (Tcherneva, 2005, p.7). 
And the final tenet, which is that government issues currency, then, spends, in exchange for 
the goods and services it desires (Febrero, 2009, p.525). The primary difference can be seen in 
the essential component of governments to hold all control over the currency through the 
central bank, which leads the supply of currency, and is reduced to being the government‟s 
“piggy” bank. The difference, despite minor, is primarily that of having the political power to 
control all money, and view the government as the sole regulator of transferring money. The 
central bank is therefore the largest and most important tenet to achieve this entire purpose. 
 Both differences between chartalists‟ and neo-chartalists‟, is relatively minor. In 
which both can be seen to be systems in which they both agree that the government needs to 
issue a monopoly-based currency which can function as a medium of exchange, which is only 
for exchange. With the specifications that it also be the only currency that can pay taxes, to 
fund the governments expenses. It also keeps in mind that the government must create a 
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demand for the currency at the same time; otherwise it may not sustain itself. In brief, it 
remains overall an accounting tool, and a way of stabilizing the government‟s expenses. 
2.3. Neo-Mercantilist School 
 Mercantilism has traditionally been a way in order to benefit society, by erecting 
barriers to trade, and concentrating on the nation-state. With a change in aspect, from 
mercantilism, to the modern definition of neo-mercantilism which seeks economic benefits 
over war. The issue of currencies has been lacking in debate, through the perfect examples 
throughout the world. 
 In the case of the Massachusetts Land Bank of 1740, it was argued that populist 
inflation among farmers (Rothbard, 1963, p.284). The case demonstrated that despite the high 
debts and inflation, the benefit was seen through the defence by the lenders and debtors, such 
as businessmen and politicians, who received engaged in inflationary pressures to the market 
by inflating debts away (Rothbard, 1963, p.284), Granting unsettled frontier land to 
speculators, who then sold these lands at a far higher price (Rothbard, 1963, p.284). Both of 
these were clearly beneficial, despite inflation would normally be returned into the economy, 
which the government would be able to reduce its overall debts, and thus finance more 
promises, the speculators were also able to gain a foothold and gain higher revenues, despite 
high inflation that would eventually wipe away the value, they could spend the money before 
the inflation destroyed the value, while diminishing the resale value of the land. However, 
even for this sort of class-based elite, it also offered businessmen something far more 
beneficial. With the constant inflation, it helped to give a subsidy to home manufacturing, by 
allowing bank debts to be repaid in certain manufactured commodities (Rothbard, 1963, 
p.284). Allowing such policies were rather beneficial, with a monopoly over currency, the 
individuals were simply forced to suffer, while business owners also benefited with the added 
reduction in the currency which helped to increase exports abroad. 
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 The policies advocated from the Massachusetts experiment, are clearly demonstrated 
throughout the world. By applying such a perspective, we can take into consideration the case 
of China. China‟s shift has been from a drastically isolationist approach, to one which is more 
mixed, by attempting to adhere to world liberal values, while ensuring a strong state 
protection (Holslag, 2006, p.136). These can be seen with China‟s manipulation of its 
currency to promote exports (Holslag, 2006, p.136). The effect of this is the beneficial aspect 
of having a central bank and monopoly, to control and plan its policies in accordance with the 
maximum return for the state, instead of the individuals in a market environment. In essence, 
with China, the case is not as much as the nation-state identity, to ensure that the Chinese 
have a higher way of life, or to give into special interest. The greater issue is to ensure that 
china‟s communist regime remains in power, by keeping people working, and enjoying 
moderately higher standards of life, compared to before the Deng Xiaoping revolution. 
China‟s particular case remains one of power for the special interest group, also known as the 
Communist Party of China. The entire economy is focused on giving some market-based 
approaches, while ensuring that it can also gain large reserves of foreign currency.  
 The issue of foreign currencies remains one of China‟s powerful methods of 
controlling many countries. By ensuring that their currency is kept artificially low, they can 
garnish large foreign reserves, in many cases the United States currency, which is often seen 
as the largest power that China hold over. As well, the Chinese have been very large on 
buying United States Treasury bills. Both these factors lead to a strong political connection, 
one which could lead to China threatening the United States to maintain a pro-Chinese policy, 
through either a threat of highly inflationary policies, through emptying their foreign reserves, 
or creating a possible run on Treasury Bills, which would most likely be stopped by large 
asset purchases from the Federal Reserve. However, the Federal Reserve‟s policy would be to 
buy bonds, which would simply lead to high inflation. This new system of currency 
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manipulation, combined with large investments in foreign countries, makes state‟s like China 
clearly beneficiaries, and bring new meaning to currency wars, or even bond wars. 
 Neo-mercantilism is an ever evolving trait, specifically for countries with strong 
interests in having politicians and special interest manipulate currencies and government 
policies, to make large beneficial effects on themselves. It also leads to a new method of also 
holding influence in the world, in a way that shelter‟s the openness and transparency that is 
normally required from one country to another or from one market participant to another. It is 
primarily about manipulating people to retain loyal, and keep power. 
2.4. Mainstream Pragmatism 
 Throughout this research, the search for motivations behind central bank 
implementation is the primary question. However, it must also be considered as to why some 
of the mainstream may prefer to simply alter policy prescriptions at the central bank, instead 
of advocating for another system. Whether they support a government monopoly over the 
currency, or if they support free banking as will be discussed later, many choose pragmatism 
and simply acknowledge the difficulties in attempting to change the system. Since the system 
of most modern central banks is based on a government monopoly over currency, it requires 
naturally to of had been passed by legislatures, could be constitutionally or legislatively 
protected. Both options often required convincing not only politicians, but the general public. 
Neither to say, changing public opinion can be rather difficult when multiple outcomes could 
be explained, and as the general public will join diverse camps, and simply be eliminated until 
one or the other is accepted. Which leads to the pragmatic approach, in essence, the basic 
concept of any normative economic theory, is to seek the grand utopian vision for monetary 
policy, which is simply labelled, stability. The following will divide into three main sections 
the diverse sets of policies which the mainstream has attempted to implement through their 
pragmatic approach, while having great doubts about the usefulness of a central bank. The 
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first will be to look at monetarist money targeting. And the second will look at the modern 
inflation targeting regime.  
2.4.1. Monetarism 
 The theory of money truly began to question scholars in the late 70‟s, after pre-
Keynesian policies of constant monetary increases were leading to out of control inflation, 
constantly rising prices. In which came the rush towards monetarism, with the powerful 
analysis of historical events, from the soon to be famous, Dr. Milton Friedman. Milton 
Friedman as most economists, saw the problem of rising prices as a great destabilize of 
economic progress, in which Friedman followed through with researching the cause. In his 
publication, A Monetary History of the United States, he concluded that there was a strong 
correlation between changed in the rate of growth of the money supply, which lead to create 
rising prices (Friedman, 1963, p.676). Friedman argued throughout his career that inflation 
was always a monetary phenomenon, which required policy makers to pay attention to it, and 
to reduce their obsession with unemployment and questions of insufficient demand in the 
economy (Friedman, 1963, p.676). Friedman demonstrated that he has professed a strong new 
method for stabilizing the economy; however, he came to have different views on what 
became labelled as a central bank admirer. 
 Friedman‟s test over central banking policy was seen as extreme, in certain cases. 
Despite having the opportunity to drastically stop the expansion of credit for political reasons, 
or the belief in shock therapy for economic reasons, he argued that he preferred the gradual 
way, in which the economy would adjust (Friedman, 1983, p.5). Friedman was generally 
pragmatic in that sense, in which he desired a clear balance, since people took time and had 
expectations for the future, as some had already been made. Friedman went on further to 
explain that he favoured a constant rule of money growth, whether or not it was desirable, he 
viewed that markets would come to accept it, since it would be rule-based, which would level 
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the playing field for all, and politically it would be far more palatable (Friedman, 1983, p.5). 
This was truly the demonstration of Friedman that it was difficult to have markets accept 
things, but more importantly, to have strict rules passed, which must go through the political 
process. Friedman explained that his motivations for the rule-based growth would need to 
have legislation passed to change institutions or implement a specific rule, as economists were 
very poor predictors of political feasibility (Friedman, 1983, p.5). The political pragmatism of 
Friedman was truly a deception of his true views about central banks and government 
monopolies in the currency market. Friedman moved on later on life to accept that a 
government monopoly on currencies was unnecessary, in which he argued against it later on, 
but he viewed that as previously argued, politics played a far too great obstacle in removing 
the monopoly (Friedman & Schwartz, 1986, p.41). Despite his rejection of opposing a 
currency monopoly, he did have a great influence on monetary policy, and the view of 
economic stability. In a way, he also came to contribute to the reasoning for competition, 
most notably the monetarist theories of constant money growth, and its effect in the long-
term. 
2.4.2. Inflation Targeting 
 Inflation targeting has been a major overarching policy at central banks throughout the 
world. The policy is to target inflation, in essence to keep it at a stable level, in which markets 
can adjust and continue growing the economy. The method to achieve this is to target a basket 
of goods, in which the bank reads the aggregate changes in prices, and changes its interest rate 
in response to prices. For example, if prices were to rise too sharply, and overreach the bank‟s 
target, the bank would proceed with raising rates, which in turn would force people to spend 
less. If prices were to fall too sharply, the central bank would apply the same policy, however, 
in the inverse, by lowering rates, in an attempt to increase aggregate demand in the economy. 
Many countries have adopted this policy, such as Australia, Canada, Finland, Israel, New 
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Zealand and Sweden (Bernanke & Mishkin, 1997, p.1). In many ways it has been argued that 
when setting interest rates, or the targets, Bernanke & Mishkin (1997, p.16) argue that there 
should be flexibility in the method of reaching the target, by allowing the central bank to have 
the freedom to target the most reasonable level of inflation, and to respond to any chocks that 
might occur, such as oil crises like the intensity of the 1980‟s. 
 In many ways this is an evolution from monetarist thought, and a move towards 
looking at alternative policies, instead of alternative institutions. There was also a move 
towards more independence, despite not being free to have the central bank in control of a 
small group of people, but it did seek to encourage a greater independence over day to day 
operations (Bernanke & Mishkin, 1997, p.21). The method of achieving this was through 
voluntary agreements between finance ministers and the central bank governors. The goal was 
to ensure accountability, but to remove the politically motivation for generally inflationary 
monetary policy (Bernanke & Mishkin, 1997, p.21). Naturally, having a monetary policy that 
was based on funding the state was seen as an evil, in which politicians could easily monetize 
debt, which would create high inflation and lead to the destruction of savings. In essence, it 
was to change the possibility of having politics involved in monetary decisions. Despite the 
change in policy, both were seen as natural airs to monetarism, which sought to remove the 
political aspect out of monetary policy, and restore a low-inflation or no-inflation 
environment. 
 The issue, despite targeting inflation, came to be a constant evolution. The evolution 
was seen as accepting the basic institution of a central bank, and the monopoly over money. 
Despite the more independent central banks, it still left the problem of competing views 
among academics, which would generally lead these banks. It was demonstrated to be simpler 
to target a zero percent inflation target, in the intermediate, than to call immediately for free 
banking (Selgin, 1997, p.14). George Selgin is a well-known free banking supporter, which 
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has constantly argued against a government monopoly on money. However, despite his case 
for free banking, which will later be discussed. His general conclusions were to simply accept 
that political forces would make it virtually impossible to achieve free banking, and instead, 
tried to shape the next step. Selgin argued that targeting nominal gross domestic product 
(NGDP), would be more beneficial, since it would solve issues he saw in not permitting 
prices to rise or fall, since as productivity increased, prices would fall, resulting in a benefit to 
society (Selgin, 1997, p.64). Despite his case, he argued that even if such a policy would be 
worth arguing for, it was not politically popular among academic to implement such a policy, 
as he therefore concluded that targeting a zero percent inflation target, would be far more 
palatable in the intermediate, by allowing some prices to rise far lower than otherwise would 
of happened under the 2 to 3% inflation target, people could at least have greater savings and 
not endure higher than necessary inflation (Selgin, 1997, p.64). This is a growing change 
among academics, which despite perhaps being opposed to the current monetary system, they 
see if politically difficult to change, due to it being controlled by legislative acts, which would 
require either constitutional change or legislative change. As legislation can take some time to 
gain approval of a parliament, it can be even more difficult to amend a constitution, for 
example the Canadian constitution
1
. It therefore leads academics and general economists to 
find more pragmatic approaches, and simply use the tools that are currently available, such as 
the central bank and attempt to implement policies that are more palatable to politicians and 
the market. 
                                                             
1 The Canadian Constitution simply holds that it is up to the federal government to have responsibilities over 
the issuance of currency. The comparison was to draw attention to the problems that have risen over 
provincial and federal jurisdiction, as for taxation reasons, it has also been a drastic failure in attempting to 
alter any powers. Most notably the failed Meech Lake Accord, which demonstrates the difficulty of amending 
such guiding documents. 
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2.5. Free Banking School 
 As the call for government monopolies or pragmatism, the generally argument against 
central banks, or the greater precision, an opposition to government control over currencies, 
has come from the Free Banking School
2
. The main charge for such a case from modern 
economists has generally come from Hayek‟s Denationalisation of Money, in which he 
argued for the competition of currencies and set the stage for modern economists to interpret 
such a policy. Hayek began looking at diverse problems, since his general argument tended to 
be competition in the market place, Hayek began to suspect that such a policy could perhaps 
be applied and lead to a no-inflation environment. It was argued that free trade in money 
would be far more beneficial, since it would permit individuals to choose the most beneficial 
currency, in which as through generations of tradition and experience, would be the currency 
which preserved savings the most, and was the most widely accepted (Hayek, 1976, p.106). 
Hayek understood that markets were the main driver of an economy, in which having 
competition always arose to the most effective allocation of resources, since it would be free 
from government manipulation and operations, since many government operations had faded 
to function correctly, most notably monopolies on telecommunication markets can be seen as 
a fine example, in which when markets were allowed to operate in a competing environment, 
prices would be reduced and the quality and innovation of entrepreneurs would spur growth 
and advancement.  
To return to this application towards monetary theory, and in context, Hayek also saw 
the dangers arising, most notably that of today‟s case over a European currency. Hayek 
viewed the European currency as a dangerous creation, which would be managed by a supra-
national authority (Hayek, 1976, p.23). Understanding the dangers of such anti-competitive 
                                                             
2 The “Free Banking School” is used to denote all economists who are affiliated with the free banking 
alternative. Many members of diverse primary schools of economic thought have come to support such a 
system, most notably Austrians and Chicago school economists; it remains not a universally accepted theory by 
most mainstream economists. 
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policies, he argued that it would be better to accept a national currency, than to bind into an 
international one (Hayek, 1976, p.24). Hayek‟s interpretation is a great insight into today‟s 
problems of using economic tools for the purpose of reaching political goals, through 
unification. In many ways, it can be argued that Hayek saw what could become a dominant 
oligopoly of currencies, in which innovation in market would be reduced, through the 
constant problem of national currencies and their legal tenders laws which forbid other 
payments, it would leave not only personal choice, but also innovative policies from banks to 
try to find the ultimate solution. Hayek‟s insight also lead the charge against government 
interference, as accepted by Bernanke or Friedman, he saw it as the ultimate danger, in which 
politicians could use the monopoly over currency for their advantage. He looked at historical 
tradition in which history has been largely inflationary, by which governments have 
continuously used the supply of money as a tool to achieve their desires (Hayek, 1976, p.24). 
However, where the true foundation of free banking comes to bear, are the dangers that were 
associated with keeping currency in the hands of government, as it would lead to the 
destruction of civilization (Hayek, 1976, p.83). This problem can be seen today, as Greece is 
on the verge of default, mass chaos is happening with violent protests, which have gone 
further by spreading to most European countries. The case for why politicians should look at 
monetary policy cannot be better explained through the explanation of Hayek‟s warnings, and 
the free banking advocates, since when politics plays an important part in deciding how the 
medium of exchange is allocated, people will be in the debts of inflation, without an 
alternative, other than to return to a barter economy.  
Despite the large criticism of political involvement, there is a way in which political 
reform could happen, and would be a great reason for political scientists to verify the validity 
of these institutions, and policies. The free banking supporters have argued often for either 
shock therapy, or incrementalism. Most notably, a plan was developed by Selgin (1998), to 
26 | P a g e  
 
drastically reduce regulations on commercial banks, and freeze the money supply, thus 
allowing the markets to adjust and not be in danger of being manipulated. The method of 
freezing the money supply, in an incremental way, has been argued by Selgin, to simply have 
the Federal Reserve announce that it would no longer issue rediscounts, after a certain date 
(Selgin, 1988, p.140). It further went on to look at the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, in the 
United States, which would allow banks more freedom over their management and 
operations, followed by eliminating government deposit insurance companies, and switching 
towards private alternatives (Selgin, 1988, p.141).  The incremental repeal is a way in order to 
move from having the government and taxpayers is forced to save these companies, to having 
both the currency and private banks hold ultimate liabilities for their actions, and be forced to 
compete in the highest of standards. 
The main interest that helps to understand monetary policy to political scientists, in 
which once knowing how monetary policy operates and the instruments of inflation, political 
scientists can see the greater impact of policies and how the market is truly a democratic 
negotiator. Without understanding how the market functions, political scientists simply grasp 
that prices raise and chaos occurs or inequalities begin to be demonstrated. However, without 
focusing on bridging the problems that arise, and policy prescriptions, they remain obsessed 
on criticising globalization or neo-liberalism for problems in economies and among society; it 
must be a mixed approach. Free banking economists have moved towards explaining the 
dangers historically, and in theory. They have implemented great strives into explaining how 
money is nothing more than a medium of exchange, which can and should be provided by the 
market, instead of a monopoly which guarantees political opportunism, instead of true desires 
for the long-term,  no inflation. 
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3.0 Historical Bond Yield Analysis 
One of the most common factors which can help politicians to either gain power or 
seek re-election is the tool of government debt. As politicians constantly seek to gain re-
election and enjoy the benefits for either rewards for the „status‟ of being a politician and 
holding such power or to satisfy their need for monetary remuneration. By looking at 
government bond yields over a long period, it can paint a larger picture of the motives from 
politicians and the benefits of lower bond yields. As it has been shown with regards to the 
financial crisis started in 2008, the United States Federal Reserve and the European Central 
Bank have engaged in numerous market operations to ease pressure on bond yields, which 
helps to reduce the rate at which politicians can borrow or pay back their debts, since high 
bond yields would signal either higher inflation predictions or an increase of risk with regards 
to lending to a government which may never pay their debts. To engage in constructive 
analysis, the following countries bond yields will be analyzed through the scope of a period of 
free banking and the modern centralized era of banking.  
For analyzing the following research, Scotland will not be analyzed due to a lack of 
bond rates. 
3.1 Australia 
Australia remains an interesting case for an analysis of bond yields, primarily due to 
its uniqueness in which it began as a colony and later transformed into a sovereign state, built 
on a federation model. To understand the analysis one must take into account that during the 
colonial rule, the colonial government did engage in numerous bond auctions, also known 
during that time as „Colonial Consol‟, all were initiated in London, which permitted the 
colonies to engage in large investments in public infrastructure (Di Marco et al., 2009, p.6). 
The easiest of such borrowing was gradually decreased through the increase of economic 
activity, or government revenues, which came to reduce the need for the colony to borrow 
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excessively large sums of monies from London (Attard, 2007, p.169). The question remains 
as to how much spending was possible under such a system, since the private sector held a 
free banking system, in which currency was privately issued by banks and had certain interest 
rate regulations from government (Homer & Sylla, 2005, p.587). It existed due to the limited 
amount of British Sterling, and permitted banks to keeps a rough average of 8% interest rates 
during 1920, and a higher rate of 10% during 1928 (Homer & Sylla, 2005, p.587). The issue 
of bond yields was clearly debated with regards to having access to credit, in which private 
markets offered a higher yield on government debt, most probably the issue of not having 
much confidence in the government. Understandably, this lack of confidence could be seen, 
since the government had roughly 60% of GDP dedicated to government debt by 1885 (Di 
Marco et al., 2009, p.7), and with a growing intensity of accumulation, no private bank would 
be attracted to such a reckless pattern of spending. Since London offered a lower interest rate, 
it demonstrated how governments benefited from a lower rate, and was able to seek a lower 
yield on financing multiple projects, often for political purposes of stabilizing the economy or 
maintaining allegiance to the British Empire, which could logically be interpreted. 
As poltical stability changed, and Australians sought to gain more independence, the 
country was merged in a federation. The new Australia came to gain control over it‟s debts, 
and most notably, it established a history of not adding debt until January 1
st
, 1911, when the 
first bond acutions occurred for the Commonwealth of Australia (Di Marco et al., 2009, p.7). 
A return to the decades of debt would resume, gradually. However, before such a return, the 
new Commonwealth of Australia ended private competing currencies in 1914 (Selgin, 1988, 
p.51). To see if there is a correlation between the end of competition among currenciees, one 
must verify if government bond yields moved in the lower yield rate which would naturally 
be easier to borrow money from. 
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Sources: Based on Reserve Bank of Australia 2012, and Homer and Sylla 2005, p. 589  
 The effect of government monopoly over the currency can be seen to demonstrate a 
great change in the way that government operations operated and the monetary system was 
transformed. Figure 1 demonstrated from the 1930‟s to today, there was a gradual change in 
bond yields, which also represented a change in debt levels and confidence within the 
government‟s ability to finance the money that it constantly borrowed. Once interest rates fell 
from the roughly 8-10% mark (Homer & Sylla, 2005, p.587), bond yields continued to fall for 
roughly 30 years, in which this could demonstrate a decrease in government debt and an 
increase in the balance sheet for the government to reduce their liabilities. However the true 
question remains as to whether this perfect scenario is the reality, since government debt 
continued to increase after the first bond issuance in 1915. As bond yields continued to fall, 
Figure 1: Long-term Australian Government Bond Yields 
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the Commonwealth government continued to increase its debt load, while reaching a 
dangerous path in the early 1980‟s, when bond yields reached the high 16-17% range. The 
long-term effect of these yields clearly demonstrate that the government‟s control over the 
money supply and the ability to perform open market operations benefited politicians by 
being able to afford cheap credit, until the private bond market simply could not hold the 
government‟s heavy addiction to debt. Once yields peaked, it can be seen that they fell 
gradually due to the fear that the government may return to the high-spending history that it 
had suffered during and after World War 2. The lower yields from the1990‟s to today can be 
seen as a proper response to a more private and conservative system of bond yields, primarily 
due to the introduction of inflation targeting and a generally more independent central bank 
before such policy tools were introduced. After the 1950‟s, the tools for monetary policy 
changed, and moved from a government-oriented treasury, to one of market-determined and 
independent central banks focused on either the money supply or inflation. The new policy 
can be seen as an attempt at controlling inflation, while also being able to reduce the amount 
of government debt that is allowed, since markets would suffer less inflation and would 
restrict the ability of the government to borrow without paying a high yield, which naturally 
would be more apparent to the average individual. 
 Australia‟s bond yields can represent multiple things, as it would be naïve to not 
include the possibility that actors in the markets would simply start to have less confidence in 
government overall, after having suffered a world war and seen an increase in political 
opportunism, as government became more transparent and less government intervention was 
seen, most notably in diverse countries throughout the liberalization of the 1980‟s. The bond 
yields of Australia can paint a picture of multiple problems, over the long-term, but the short-
term outlook after the monopoly over a currency can be seen with the lower rates that 
politicians could of paid in the 1930‟s, compared to the 1800‟s. Any politician with such a 
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possibility to borrow at rates 4-6% lower would clearly be motivated to engage in endless 
borrowing to meet his election or re-election possibilities.  
3.2 Sweden 
Sweden had seen a drastic change over the past three centuries with regards to 
government debt and government control over currencies. For the comparison and analysis of 
yields and currency ownership, it is important to take into consideration that Sweden 
experienced a free banking period from 1830 to 1903 (Lakomaa, 2007, p.25). For the major 
part of the history of Sweden, the central bank, also known as the Riksbank was in control of 
the money supply, and provided the main financing of credit to the Swedish government. The 
following analysis will look at bond yields from 1856 to 2006, as the government only started 
issuing bonds in 1855 (Homer & Sylla, 2005, p.269).  And a comparison to government debt 
accumulation will also be taken in consideration from 1719 to modern times, ending with the 
year 2003. 
Figure 2: Short-Run Swedish Government Bond Yields: 1856-2006 
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Source: Based on Waldenstrom 2011 
 The changing pattern of bond yields in Figure 2 demonstrates an interesting pattern of 
stability from the beginning of the recorded times in 1856, up until roughly the 1930‟s. Such 
an observation would demonstrate that there was no difference between the free-banking era 
and up to 30 years after the introduction of a national currency. The only difference is that in 
1897, there is a drastic movement in interest rates, rising past the 5% mark, while remaining 
above that mark until the 1920‟s, when a drop would continue for multiple decades. It begs 
the question as to whether economic necessity was truly in the best interest, since the market-
era of free banking provided lower bond yields, in many respects, it was most likely that the 
government was held in a strong position to not attack the banking sector in large-scale debt 
through the Bank of Sweden, or else, there would be an attack on most individuals which 
would call out the government for such actions. In many respects it‟s needed to analyze 
government debt accumulation to verify if indeed such lower bond yields were caused by 
increased government borrowing. 
33 | P a g e  
 
 Source: Based on Fregert and Gustafsson2007 
Based on the evidence from debt accumulation, it looks clear as government debt 
began to increase in the early 30‟s, in which time the government became an addict of 
borrowing money to finance its multiple electoral promises, or the results which would be the 
diverse welfare state policies. Although Figure 3 doesn‟t properly give eye to debt 
accumulation, it does demonstrate that from the 1930‟s to the 1990‟s, there was a drastic 
increase in debt accumulation, in many respect, an addiction of adding more and more debt at 
a higher to higher ratio per year. In many respects, the lower interest rates can demonstrate a 
growing amount of debt, and can question whether politicians had planed such events. In a 
realistic scenario, it could be seen as a gradual policy, since most private banks would have 
continued a tradition of conservative banking, while gradually having the government change 
the mentality of individuals and encourage the accumulation of debt. Since in any scenario, 
once individuals are set in a mindset that debt is dangerous and at the micro-level, the average 
voter would see what kind of debt they normally would face in a household, it is far less 
Figure 3: Swedish Government Debt: 1719-2003 
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likely that they would be supportive or having the state increase debt, since it would naturally 
have to be paid-back at a high rate of interest. 
 The Swedish case truly gives wonder as to whether market forces were being the 
change in government currency, or if the low rates for bond yields under government control 
of the money supply would have helped to reduce rates and yield large spending promises. 
Since individuals respond to market prices far better than governments, it‟s understandable 
that individuals would have to change their habits and mindset, while governments would be 
forced to ensure that any such electoral promises merited debt-funding, often being issues 
such a infrastructure spending on large-scale projects such as new highways or airports. The 
other issue to be asked later, is whether the low bond yield was responsible for bringing about 
the decades of change, since individuals could become accustom to lower yields, in which 
banks would naturally be encouraged to lend at such low rates and assume a changing mindset 
in the household over what a naturally market rate should be, and whether it has become 
easier to acquire debt and to repay it. 
3.3 Switzerland 
 The Swiss case comes from a different time in which government intervention and 
management was not the norm for most Swiss citizens, as politicians continued to follow. 
Switzerland for example began in the early 19
th
 century to embrace a liberal approach to 
policy, most notably embracing free banking and allowing competing currencies at the 
cantonal level (Weber, 1992, p.187). This change after the war, allowed for full competition 
among currencies, and ensuring that no currency laws existed while capital could flow freely 
throughout Switzerland (Weber, 1992, p.187). When considering the analysis of bond yields, 
it‟s important to note that the competition forced government to borrow from private banks, 
while some cantons did own banks; they were nonetheless forced under the veil of 
competition to ensure proper operations and not finance large-scale debt. 
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Figure 4: Swiss Private Banks Lending Discount Rate: 1838-1893 
 
Source: Based on Baumgartner2007 
 As demonstrated in Figure 4, it can be noted that the rates that citizens would be 
forced to pay was rather conservative, since starting in 1848, rates were lowered and then 
were drastically increased over a number of years. The long-term effect was to generally have 
higher interest rates than was once offered under the former currency monopolies which 
allowed for a roughly 4% rate on borrowing. Under the free banking system, the rates we‟re 
roughly between 3% and 6.5%. Such rates would make borrowing rather expensive and would 
be very discouraging for any citizens to take, yet alone a government, which would be forced 
to endure large interest payments on debt. However, as it can be noticed later on, when the 
new national Swiss currency was introduced in 1881, rates fell the following year and 
continued to fall to reach a rough average of 3%. Such a reduction was kept for approximately 
6 years, in which then rates roses to 4%, while then falling back into the 3% range. The 
introduction of a new currency permitted the lower rate, allowing markets to borrow cheaper 
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credit with lower rates. In many respects, with a new monopoly, the government was free to 
engage in large-scale spending. 
Figure 5: Switzerland's Public Debt: 1880-1913 
 
 Source: Based on Flandreau and Zumer 
It‟s clear that when the government ended free banking, rates on borrowing fell in 
some range close to 2% points lower than they would have been. As this happened, 
government borrowing increased over the next few years to reach an all time high in 1913. 
The ever growing amount of debt, and change for 7 years after the introduction of the new 
currency clearly demonstrates that citizens adjusted themselves to the rates as they were 
falling and most likely adjusted to the new environment while believing that this was the new 
norm. Under this, politicians took advantage of the lower rates and engage in large-scale 
expansion of spending; permitting them to engage in campaign promises and allows diverse 
social programs to come into existence. Clearly, politicians must have seen the benefit of such 
a system; otherwise it would have seemed foolish to engage in such a drastic overhaul of the 
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monetary system. Although there were times throughout history in which the government did 
alter itself and reduce the amount of debt, in many instanced, the amounts reduced could 
simply be from the initial effect of economic expansion due to debt, and the long-term belief 
that the debt would be paid back. In many essences, following a wave of false economic 
growth built-on public debt. However, multiple reasons could explain the spending, which 
can only be interpreted through the lens of economic history, such as periods of war, which 
will be analyzed later in the paper. 
3.4 United States 
 The ever evolving United States of America has seen drastic changes throughout its 
history, whether it be from wars to leading the world in economic development. There have 
been trails and errors throughout its history and many lessons have been learnt, and some are 
still left open to be learnt. The United States allowed state legislatures to issue bank charters, 
which was interpreted to mean that an institution could provide bank notes (Dowd, 1992, 
p.206). Under the free banking period from different states, the general national currency was 
introduced in 1863, after the civil war broke out, the government introduced the National 
Banking legislation to ensure that the government could ensure a stable currency and fund 
war efforts (Dowd, 1992, p.230). Analyzing government bond yields during this time and 
government debt is an essential step towards understanding the correlation between both, and 
the nature of government monopolies over currencies, primarily in the United States‟ context. 
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Figure 6: United States' Government Bond Yields: 1830-1989 
 
 Source: Based on Homer and Sylla2005 
During the time of free banking from 1837 to 1864, the rates were rather stable 
between 4% and 6%. The stability over 30 years was rather remarkable, in which the market 
was able to compete and ensure that proper standards were permitted. While if one takes into 
consideration when all competition from private or state-issued charter banks ended in 1913, a 
drastic increase in bond rate instability can be seen until the modern-era. The correlation 
between yields and government indebtedness has to now be compared.  
 United States debt has been drastically discussed recently, but the true question is 
whether the data supports the argument that a change in currency could create such a large 
different in debt accumulation. As Figure 7 demonstrates, when currency competition was 
suspended in 1963, there was a drastic increase in the national debt, most notably due to the 
war, which allowed the government to inflate itself in a war. While the civil war was winding 
down, the government returned the allowance of state-issued charter banks the right to 
introduce competing currencies once again, at a lesser level of freedom (Dowd, 1992, p.230), 
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but nonetheless to a “freer” system than was existent for the few years of the war. The 
correlation with debt can be greatly seen, as when the free-banking era was discontinued and 
the national currency was introduced in 1913, the amount of debt continued the climb into the 
Second World War and continued until interest rates were drastically on the increasing scale, 
which encouraged government to reduce spending, and run budgetary surpluses to reduce the 
debt. 
Figure 7: United States' Debt-to-GDP: 1791-2008 
 
 Source: Based on Henning2008 
The effect of having a government currency can clearly be demonstrated in the United 
States‟ history as an excellent case of where a government currency is introduced to ensure 
that all citizens obey the government‟s monetary system and are forced to endure inflation, 
until barter systems are created. The applicable problem of having government owned 
currency can be seen for its effect of inflation, as the national currency‟s re-introduction came 
at a similar time in 1913, when the United States was preparing to go to war,, while being 
able to inflate ones currency and destroy savings would be a far more interesting and soluble 
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plan than engaging in raising taxes to unseen levels in the United State‟s history. The United 
States still remains the prime example of government politicians and their desire to engage in 
political opportunistic policies, whether it is state programs, or for nationalist reasons which 
wars are often fought.  
4.0 Central Banking Legislation 
 In every country, the basis for every central bank resides in the legal powers that 
permits the monopoly over a currency, to be given to a specific institution. For any monopoly 
to be given, government legislation must be introduced, and naturally through any legislative 
process includes reasoning for introducing the legislation and the operations as to how the law 
should permit actors or institutions to act. By analyzing the follow central bank acts, it will 
help to shed light on the reasoning given for the introduction of central banks and the 
operational instructions. The diverse information that can be gathered from the legislation will 
gravely help to increase the understanding as to what the goals of the central banks are and 
whether they truly did follow such procedures, which will be explained later. 
4.1 Australian Reserve Bank Act 
 Australia has a central bank which has been ever evolving over diverse times. Most 
notably, its modern interpretation and government have been vested in the Reserve Bank. The 
importance of the Reserve Bank remains great for the Australian economy, since it vest such 
powers over an entire currency and its powers to decide the countries system of accounts, as a 
medium of exchange. 
 Australia‟s Reserve Bank has been focused for a long-period on a basic set of 
principles, most notably defined in Section 10 of the Reserve Bank Act. The act gives the 
Reserve Bank the duty to engage in the stability of the currency of Australia, followed by the 
maintenance of full employment in Australia, and the economic prosperity and welfare of the 
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people of Australia (Commonwealth Government of Australia, 1973). All of which are three 
overarching goals that remain extremely broad in scope. The stability of the currency is an 
extremely broad concept, primarily due to the fact that stability could be either interpreted as 
preserving the value of a currency or a stable exchange rate, or simply engaging in ensuring 
that the currency is continuously used in Australia. Stabilizing a currency can also be 
interpreted as being the stability of stable expectations over its movements, such as engaging 
in inflation targeting or even engaging in exchange rate fixations, both which help the 
currency remain relatively stable and predictable, compared to more liberal interpretations of 
monetary policy and the power of manipulating the supply of money in the economy.  
The further interpretation of full employment can also be interpreted as an extremely 
difficult and subjective term to define, since the Reserve Bank could engage in monetary 
manipulation to encourage economic growth through increasing demand, although, it still 
doesn‟t have an extremely strong control over employment, since an economy‟s employment-
level isn‟t simply related to monetary policy. In many ways, the full employment regime can 
also contradict the first duty of the bank in stabilizing the currency, which both policies can 
come in opposition to each other .The employment level can be adjusted, but the bank still 
gains a strong power, while permitting the High Court to not try individuals who would go 
abroad the duty, since it‟s already difficult to confine the Banks operational powers. 
The last aspect of the central bank revolves around economic prosperity and the 
general welfare, which in many cases can either be interpreted as being a protection of 
economic purchasing power or the second of social stability through employment levels. 
When individuals seek to engage in prosperity, the accumulation of wealth remains the 
primary goal of most individuals with regards to satisfying their desires, generally known as 
the Economic Man (Hargreaves-Heap, 2008). The contradiction becomes rather political once 
individuals begin to smooth over bad economic policies on the fiscal side of government 
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intervention, or natural market recessions which are naturally moral interventions where 
people can come to reject in favour of more emotional or political interpretations of society. 
When the bank engages in manipulation of either, it demonstrate a strong interference in the 
political arena, while neglecting the independence that a central bank normally would engage, 
compared to the private market. 
The tools given to the Reserve Bank are rather numerous. The Reserve Bank has the 
power to receive money on deposit, to borrow money, to lend money, to buy and sell bills of 
exchange, followed by other powers to engage in loans (Commonwealth Government of 
Australia, 1973). And ever growing power, since the bank‟s power over engaging in buying 
or selling  treasury bills permits it to funds multiple sources of the Australian economy, from 
the government to private sector individuals, or intermediary banks. With regards to 
governments, it‟s an interesting concept; as such activity permits politicians to constantly 
borrow money from the taxpayers of Australia, instead of borrowing funds from foreign 
countries, or conservative primate market banks. 
The Australian central bank‟s legislation clearly rejects a clear and focused goal, it 
remains a more broad perspective of ensuring that the economy can engage in broad goals that 
all individuals want within society, such as stabilizing the economy or attempting to maintain 
full employment. The Reserve Bank has almost all powers that one would expect a standard 
bank to have, but the power to borrow money to the government, while debasing or being able 
to borrow the taxpayers dollar in this case can be seen as a back-door approach to governance, 
which any government would greatly appreciate. 
4.2 Swedish Sveriges Riksbank Act 
Sweden‟s Riksbank has served as the country‟s central bank for a long period of time; 
most notably it was introduced and operated with guidance from the Sveriges Riksbank Act. 
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The act set out diverse goals, all of which are far more technical and focused on monetary 
policy, while encouraging the separation of government intervention in the money markets.  
The Riksbank Act laid out the main objectives of the bank, all of which are set to 
encourage the standard powers of a stable monetary system. The legislation gave the 
Riksbank the duties to ensure price stability, create a safe payments system, and engage in 
regulatory power s over the monetary system (The Riksbank, 2011). All three duties remain 
rather broad. The concept of price stability can be interpreted to describe multiple 
possibilities, whether price stability describes ensuring that prices remains stable over a period 
of time or if they are to rise at a stable rate in the long-term. The safe payments objective 
remains broad, since safe payments can be a very diverse way to make safe payments, as 
ensuring that payments were safe or secure is traditionally within the purview of the police to 
ensure. The regulatory powers clause leaves open the possibility of regulating any single 
aspect of markets, even the most remote and gray area remains a dangerous power to permit a 
central bank to engage in. It also is very questionable in its scope since it does not 
differentiate between many financial powers which normally should be permitted for private 
banks to experiment with. 
 It‟s a very dangerous precedent to devolve all legislative powers over monetary and 
financial affairs to an independent institution, without having day to day operations and 
accountability from politicians, it begs the question as to whether such an institution is far 
more dangerous than a supranational institution, such as the European Central Bank. 
4.3 Swiss National Bank Law 
 For the great Swiss confederation, also known as the banker‟s country of the world is 
bound to the modern standing of the Loi sur la Banque Nationale. The Swiss National Bank 
law is focused on the economic stability of the country through a stable monetary system.  
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 The Swiss National Bank(SNB) law gives a direct role to the central bank in 
exercising a monopoly over the Suisse currency, better explained as having the exclusive right 
to emit Swiss bank notes (Assemblée fédérale de la Confédération suisse, 2003). The bank‟s 
right over the currency is reinforced with specific duties. The diverse duties of the SNB are to 
primarily conduct monetary policy in the interest of the country, by ensuring stable prices 
(Assemblée fédérale de la Confédération suisse, 2003). A very broad goal, however the law 
does give certain limits on the powers of the central bank. The limits of power on the central 
bank ensure that its duties are to ensure proper liquidity of Swiss francs in the money market 
(Assemblée fédérale de la Confédération suisse, 2003). The banks also follows different limits 
by ensuring that proper cash distribution must be provided to the entire Swiss economy, while 
also facilitating the proper functioning of the payment system , including the management of 
monetary reserves, all of which contributes to the stability of the financial system (Assemblée 
fédérale de la Confédération suisse, 2003). The general guidelines do give the bank a certain 
amount of direction; however the guidelines are still very broad and lack any specific 
direction. Any central bank can engage in ensuring liquidity in the market although which 
amount of degree is critical. Ensuring that the cash distribution is the duty of any bank, to 
ensure that market actors receive proper amounts of cash to maintain a proper accounting 
system, although the issue that arises is again, to what degree? The other limits of the bank to 
manage monetary reserves remains an extremely broad definition, in which managing 
reserves is very subjective and questionable as to what function it should serve. The last limit 
for the SNB to follow, that of contributing to the stability of the financial system is one of the 
most broad definitions possible, in which the stability of any monetary system could fall if the 
central bank engaged in reckless monetary policy or if market actors, such as intermediate 
banks, were to collapse, in which the stability of the financial system could be increased 
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through open-market operations but the value of savings could be destroyed with such issues, 
or even the drastic reduction of the exchange rate.  
 Despite the issue surrounding the definition of the duties of the central bank, there 
remains a great deal of interesting duties left to the SNB. The independence of central bank 
policy is protected under Article 6 of the law, in which it is guaranteed that the SNB cannot be 
forced to engage in policy by instruction of the Federal council, the federal assembly or other 
organisations (Assemblée fédérale de la Confédération suisse, 2003).  A clear guarantee of 
independence over monetary policy is rather interesting, since it leaves the door open to 
ultimate police and a lack of clear accountability, as some may argue that the Federal 
Assembly should be able to adjust monetary policy as it believes just and correct. Despite the 
diverse limits and objectives of Swiss National Bank, there does seem to have a general idea 
of independence and attempt at performing a monetary policy based on stability and exclusion 
from the political arena, although, it still does leave the policies open to interpretation and 
communicable with the Confederation government.  
4.4 United States Federal Reserve Act 
 The world‟s superpower has traditionally been strong militarily and economically. The 
financial power of the United States lies in the United States Dollar, which is managed by the 
United States Federal Reserve System. The United States Federal Reserve System receives its 
power from congress most notably written in the Federal Reserve Act. The Federal Reserve 
Act is an extensively written act which grants large amounts of powers into the Federal 
Reserve to conduct monetary policy. 
 The Federal Reserve act added multiple members to a special board which would 
oversee the Federal Reserve‟s goal of stable monetary policy. The Federal Reserve Board, as 
it is called, was created with a membership which consists of seven members, including the 
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Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency, followed by five members 
appointed by the President of the United States (United States Congress, 1958). The 
commitment to ensuring an independent monetary policy is apparent with the enactment of 
such a board, while ensuring that some accountability is offered through the interaction of the 
Secretary of the Treasury and the President‟s power to appoint members. Moving in a general 
direction of separation of power is a clear demonstration that removing the Federal Reserve 
from the political arena of day-to-day operations which normally could be manipulated to be 
used for financing government expenditures. Naturally, an interesting separation of power, 
and commitment to independence. 
 The Federal Reserve Act also gives way to one of the most important powers any 
central bank can have over debt or other monetary policy. The power to engage in open-
market operations is stated as allowing the Federal Reserve to engage in open market 
operations to purchase and sell at home or abroad, diverse securities and bills of exchange 
(United States Congress, 1958). The power to engage in open-market operations with diverse 
governments and complete control over controlling the entire market gives the Federal 
Reserve extreme powers to control the entire market at any time, in many ways, it does gives 
the Federal Reserve the right to buy government securities which could help reduces bond 
yields in many ways, such as the current 2008 financial crisis, in which the Federal Reserve 
bought many mortgages and government bonds to help reduce yields on the public debt. It 
begs to question if the act of having an independent bank like the Federal Reserve is truly 
independent, since the individuals on the board is chosen by a politician, which can appoint 
ideological appointees to operate monetary policy. 
 Monetary Policy can only be affected if a monopoly is granted, which the Federal 
Reserve has held for decades. The power in which the Federal Reserve Act adds is the natural 
monopoly over money, in which it is given the power to issue notes, while offering to redeem 
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them when demanded in gold, at the Treasury Department, or in certain cases at any Federal 
reserve bank (United States Congress, 1958). The fact that the legislation gives a detailed 
analysis of how the Federal Reserve should operate with regards to note issuance and having 
to tie notes to gold demonstrates a strong accountability feature in which the Federal Reserve 
would be tied to gold and forced to not expand the money supply recklessly, and cause rapid 
inflation. This initial tie to gold can be interpreted as attempting to maintain a sound payment 
system, in which the money supply would not be used for political purposes, but simply to 
ensure that a standard note which would be accepted at all businesses as tender and for an 
automatic redemption in gold which has been a matter of currency for thousands of years. 
Reducing the need for day-to-day transactions in gold or constant transfer of gold between 
private banks gave such a strong transparency mechanism and helped to reduce transaction 
costs by not having to transport large quantities of gold during regular times or even more 
frequent when economics crises would arise.  
 Maintaining a responsible and accountable currency was a drastically important 
feature which could not be enforced unless both aspects of the currency link were stable. The 
Federal Reserve Act saw the dangers of fiat currencies in which it gave the Federal Reserve 
the exclusive duty to ensure that all currency would be engraved in the best manner to guard 
against counterfeits and fraudulent alternatives (United States Congress, 1958). A duty which 
often can be interpreted as with regards to any bank, although the important feature of 
ensuring that note were transparent was an essential feature of the gold standard, which the 
Federal Reserve first began under. The danger that would arise should the notes be fraudulent, 
then naturally the government would have criminals redeeming gold for papers which 
represented absolutely no value than an overinflated currency. 
 A large reserve of American currency is an ever changing nature throughout the 
world, while the Americans continue to fill their banks with Americans reserves. The Federal 
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Reserve Act empowers the Federal Reserve to set requirements for all bank reserves, and 
defines the possibility of holding multiple bank reserves at the Federal Reserve or even 
certain defined banks in diverse cities (United States Congress, 1958). Such a power is very 
powerful, since it allows the Federal Reserve to engage in selecting the ratio of reserves banks 
must hold, in essence, limiting the amount of money that banks can loan instead of putting 
them into their vaults. A clear power to engage in such regulation permits the Federal Reserve 
to select diverse ratios and in many essence engage in political or personal opportunism in 
setting favourable ratios for diverse banks, by allowing to lend more money, it permits banks 
to gain a foothold in the political arena or compete with other banks through having a chance 
to gain more remuneration from interest on loans compared to certain banks who could lend 
less. 
 The Federal Reserve Act permits the Federal Reserve to engage in multiple 
transactions, often aimed at financial stability in the general text; however it does allow the 
possibility of political and business advantages through corrupt practices of permitting lower 
bank reserve ratios for certain banks that are connected to the Federal Reserve Board. Powers 
such as having the monopoly over a currency and being linked to gold is a naturally powerful 
idea for previous times, although it does leave open the door to counterfeiting credit and 
having gold stolen, instead of the free banking-era of recognizing bank notes as credit, which 
could allow small inflation, instead of large gold losses. Overall, the Federal Reserve lacks a 
long thought over the problems that it could create and forbid equality over banks. 
4.5 Scotland and the Bank of England 
 Throughout the different periods of Scotland history, there has always been a diverse 
amount of banks and currency options. During diverse times Scotland has had different 
currencies from Scotland‟s former private currencies or state-issued currency, which merged 
in 1845 to embrace the British Pound as the new unified currency. Scotland‟s change to the 
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British Pound was based primarily on the union of both countries, although, the change came 
after the private sector of the economy had competed for over a hundred years, in which the 
government abandoned free banking and engaged in a unified currency. The unification was 
due primarily to a currency war. Despite these changes, the modern Bank of England‟s start 
should be analyzed for its origination, which naturally started the new currency which the 
Scottish would come to embrace in the long-term. 
 The creation of the Bank of England is relied in the Bank of England Act 1694. The 
creation of the Bank of England was very interesting with regards to the direct motivations for 
creating a monopoly over the currency, since the primary goal was to fund the War against 
France (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 1694). The monarch gave the power through such 
an act to grant upon Tonnage of Ships, Vessels and other companies or sectors to fund the 
fight against France by adding diverse increase in supplies (Parliament of the United 
Kingdom, 1694). The basic issue of having a government currency for war remains the most 
common issue, since it opens the central bank to engage in inflationary pressure, as in the case 
of the Bank of England, it permitted the monarch or Parliament to fund all issues related to 
war, or even to permit themselves to enjoy the possibility of enriching themselves. The Act 
ordered the advance of fifteen hundred thousand pounds (Parliament of the United Kingdom, 
1694), which does differentiate itself from other central bank acts, since it gave a direct order 
for certain sums, compared to general monetary policy. The specific Act also permitted the 
Bank to buy and sell Bullion, Gold, Silver or Bills of Exchanges (Parliament of the United 
Kingdom, 1694). The multitude of issues surrounding such an Act remains very diverse, since 
the specification remains extremely determined to fund wars, while lacking the issue of strong 
accounting or even how to engage in market operations to ensure that the market is operated 
in a stable method, compared to simply inflating the market when the government or monarch 
requires funds for war or any other issues. 
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5.0 Financial and Economic Stability  
 Economic and financial stability are linked through the hip, in which if either one 
fails, it is most definitely that the other will suffer drastically. The analysis will take into 
consideration the diverse countries financial and overall economic stability during the free 
banking transition, in which government abandoned free banking and embraced central 
banking. The question will be to analyze as to whether it was due to political opportunism or 
economic necessity as often argued, which normally casts a draconian view of free banking 
stability and instead calls for large government intervention and monopoly over currencies. 
5.1 Australia 
 The transition to centralized banking occurred after a drastic banking crisis which saw 
housing prices collapse and a large number of private banks collapse. In many cases, the 
question that is surrounded is whether the housing collapse was one of natural economic 
failure or politicians desires to respond to a crisis in an attempt to seek re-election. 
 Banking crisis are never small effects on economic activity, since they found the basis 
of any economy and the chance of professional lending. In the case of 1891-1892, 41 financial 
companies failed due to having a higher cost of borrowing in Britain (Hickson & Turner, 
2002, p.148). Naturally it‟s to be expected, since if the British economy governs monetary 
policy from a different country, with a different focus, it‟s natural that at one time or another 
there would be an increase in the borrowing cost, and as interest rates on deposits rose in 
Britain, capital would return, instead of being saved in Australia. Since the fall in the money 
supply would reduce the demand for housing and mortgages, with a fall in price values, 
naturally banks would have to renegotiate their loans and accept losses, or in the case of the 
land crash, to have banks fail.  
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 With the crisis spreading throughout Australia and causing much uncertainty, any 
individuals would become worried and start to question the credibility of diverse institutions. 
As noted, in 1893, once the Federal Bank failed (Hickson & Turner, 2002, p.161), such an 
institution through its name or even simply its recognition naturally would create a panic and 
cause a run on banks, however the issue surrounding a failure of free banking needs to be 
considered. Even if a bank were to fail, the question surrounding whether such a failure was a 
proper correction in the market is the primary issue, since having banks engage in improper 
practices would require the unstable banks to collapse and then regain the confidence of 
individuals through engaging in proper banking practices and increasing transparency through 
private insurance companies or even creating a banking association. With regards to stability, 
the issue of a monopoly over a currency and heavy regulations is rather ridiculous since 
markets would re-stabilize themselves, even under government management the instabilities 
can arise through inflationary policies or government policies which are chosen by the well-
connected. 
 An argument over the market‟s influence on banks is unquestionably ridiculous in any 
statement regarding dangers of competition. The argument that lower charter values arose due 
to competition (Hickson & Turner, 2002, p.152) is reasonable to understand why banks would 
hold less assets, since more banks would hold less assets each, however the idea that 
competition could drive these charter banks to engage in riskier practices (Thomson & 
Abbott, 2001, p.72) simply hasn‟t been proven competently. Competition naturally would 
force certain banks to engage in a fierce attack on the market and satisfying customers and 
attempting to attract their deposits and create a profit. The problem that arises with the theory 
of competition as the cause of the bank failures is due to the problem in which banks would 
increase risk taking simply to compete for market shares, as any large increase in the market 
would cause housing prices to rise and for banks to fail in the long-term, which certain banks 
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may naturally choose such a reckless method, although strong banks that would not engage in 
such actions naturally would remain afloat and gain a greater share in the market. Competition 
is the answer to ensuring a strong market and attempting new ideas, and any diversion of this 
leads to the natural state of monopoly or oligopoly and unsound bank practices. 
 The problem that arose with the failure can be viewed as a political crisis, since 
individuals joined together and ask that the problems of banks be solved. The opportunist 
behaviour began when the governments began to intervene, in which politicians were able to 
be re-elected or even elected. The problem is always a method in which politicians can gain 
fame for attempting to solve or at least stabilize for the short-term. In the case of Australia, 
politicians acted too soon, by calling bank holidays and implementing more regulations and a 
central bank. The problem of any institution failing or not achieving optimal goals is the 
natural order of things in any society, in the market place corrections will always arise as 
confidence and contracts are upheld and adjusted without political pressures, while 
government engage in politically-calculated moves which may simply delay problems and 
offer simplistic and costly remedies, such as inflation in banking. 
5.2 Sweden 
 The ever evolving banking system in Sweden was relatively stable. The financial 
stability was market during the 1800‟s in which only one bank failed, Vadstena Enskilda 
Bank (Lakomaa, 2007, p.40). The fact that only one bank failed during the entire free banking 
period demonstrates a strong robustness to diverse stresses which are normal for banking 
systems. The Vadstena Enskilda Bank only collapsed due to fraud and theft committed by the 
bank manager, as the customers of the bank did not incur any losses when it was closed 
(Lakomaa, 2007, p.40). With such a stable banking system, it questions the reasoning for 
transitioning to a central bank. When a market is entirely stable, it leaves open the possibility 
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that nation-building or simply the desire to be able to devalue a currency and engage in 
government spending, for politicians. 
5.3 Switzerland 
 Stability under free banking has often been questioned in Switzerland due to the 
diverse problems that arose with banks and price stability.  In many arguments the question 
over whether price stability could be maintained under free banking or if the private banks 
would simply engage in large and constant loans in an attempt to increase either use of their 
notes or to benefit from inflationary pressures. 
One of the main argument gives has been the lack of proper clearing houses to 
stabilize and permit the financial system to be more stable. One of the prime examples of 
questionable stability was the issue of redeeming foreign notes, since it was feared that the 
foreign institutions would not return the banks own notes (Neldner, 1998, p.294). Naturally, if 
one were to consider the difference of times during the 18
th
 century, it isn‟t very difficult to 
understand that during a time of large shipments of gold, other metals, or even just the basic 
shipping, such costs were unbelievable high due to the lack of modern airplanes or high-speed 
trains. In many ways, the effects of modern technology and globalization would easily be 
understood as a method to engage in a more stable banking system for clearing houses, 
however during the previous era it is very questionable if stability was possible under a free –
banking Switzerland. Despite the question of stability, the stability would still be present as 
markets would be able to clear themselves and price-levels at the local level would remain 
relatively stable, or in the case that a rapid influx of Swiss Francs were to occur, banks could 
either dismiss their notes or most probably increase rates for bank deposits.  
The Swiss National Bank was a logical conclusion to induce stability and help 
clearing notes. The issue of the Swiss National Bank that can be viewed as different remains 
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the fact that it was not forced upon by government but was instead greatly called upon by the 
majority of bankers (Neldner, 2003, p.404). The new National Bank would also be composed 
primarily of representatives from all of the former private issuers (Neldner, 2003, p.404). 
Such a change was drastically different from other central banks which often were created due 
to nationalism, in many regards, the Swiss case could be argued that during the time, Swiss 
citizens viewed the Swiss National Bank as an economic necessity, although it could still be 
argued that having simply create a private bank of note clearing would have served a greater 
purpose and permitted the market to continue to compete under certain circumstances. Even 
with a private clearance bank, competition could have been upheld to ensure that diverse trials 
of monetary policy could be implemented. The government was not entirely needed and a 
monopoly over the currency can be viewed as not necessary, since the market could have 
provided the same benefit. To ensure that currencies were also differentiated, diverse banks 
could have refused to accept certain banks and deal directly with other banks through inter-
bank accounting. 
5.4 United States 
 The stability of banks under the free banking era in the United States is rather 
controversial since the freedom of banks was not to the highest extent. Banks in many 
instances were bound by state legislatures, through either state charters or state laws. 
 The 26 years of state chartered banks was based primarily on the idea that simply 
competition would stabilize the system, as it did succeed in that aspect (Bordo & Schwartz, 
1995, p.461). The experiment had been argued to of failed due primarily to state interference 
in production and pricings decisions, as states had an interest in encouraging inflation and 
lack of redeemable notes and currency (Bordo & Schwartz, 1995, p.461). Such stability could 
be argued to be an attempt at simply defending a theory of free banking, however when the 
government charters permitted the government to regulate and reduce any decision making 
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authority on the bank‟s, since they were responsible for all liabilities, it remained a bizarre 
mix. As well, with a lack of legal defence of contracts, it did open the possibility of having 
diverse banks engage in inflationary pressure for the well-connected.  
 A great change in government policy can be reflected throughout the history of New 
York with regards to economic, or more focused banking change in the following case. In 
1838, a great change occurred when individuals came to reject the politicization of economic 
matters and rejected the legislature‟s interference in economic issues (Bodenhorn, 2006, 
p.252). The drastic change which occurred helped to cleanse the ever evolving problems of 
short-minded voters who often advocate policies which will enrich their lives, while 
neglecting the larger implications. While also rejecting government politicization of the 
economy and the banking sector, a growing change occurred in which the well-connected 
businessmen would be forced to compete and endure market stresses, instead of using 
common legislation to regulate and attack their opponents.  
 Government charted banks were numerous throughout diverse states. The effect on the 
market of private bank notes was negative as often argued, the governments often interfered 
with how banks could stop any economic crisis, such as limiting the amount of notes that 
banks could create in response to major shocks (Selgin, 2000). Without taking into 
consideration the political interference from legislative laws, one cannot comprehend the 
basic reasoning for failing institutions. In many regards, the demonstration of legal 
interference remains the prime motivator for disrupting any institution. Without allowing 
markets to correct themselves and solve problems by their own hand, or through an impartial 
justice system, markets will always be argued to be the problem when one fails, while 
neglecting the government involvement in precipitating a crisis. 
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5.5 Scotland 
 Scotland has to be one of the oldest and most well renowned cases of free banking. 
The transition from a free banking system into a monetary union occurred when it joined in a 
union with Britain. The question to be asked is whether the banking system was truly so 
unstable that government intervention and monopolization was necessary. 
 Scotland‟s period of free banking lasted for close to 150 years, while enduring 
multiple changes at the level of government legislation. The Scottish experience of free 
banking setup a note exchange system through two state banks, that of the Bank of Scotland 
and the Royal Bank of Scotland, which both were recognized by Westminster as 
representatives of the banking system as a whole (Dow, 1996, p.704). The fact that such an 
intrusion occurred could explain the eventual collapse of the system, since when an oligopoly 
of two banks and a legal recognition of their superiority can distort the market by encouraging 
individuals to take a greater stake in such banks. 
 Despite the issue of government intervention in the market place for banking, there 
were diverse success stories. The stability of the Scottish banking system was demonstrated in 
the 1820s during a depression when 60 banks failed in England while only one in Scotland 
(Hickson & Turner, 2004, p.914). Even with an interventionist policy, it‟s clear that the 
market-based competition helped to stabilize the market and reduce the dependence on the 
state, while permitting banks to manage their own affairs. However it still doesn‟t fit the ideal 
model of a free banking system, since they were still rather dependent on a central bank in a 
certain sense, since they were able to suspend specie payment when English did in 1797, 
which lasted until 1821, which doesn‟t fit the standard defence of property rights of the 
depositors (Rothbard, 1988, pp.230-31). Market stability can be described through the real 
economic development that occurred. 
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 The issue of boom and bust cycles is rather important to understand in the case of 
Scotland. The problem that arose was the constant series of boom and bust cycles of 1760, 
1772, 1778, 1793, 1797, 1802-03, 1809-10, 1810-11, 1818-19, 1825-26, 1836-37, 1839 and 
1845-47 (Rothbard, 1988, p.230). In many regards the system failed to ensure stability, as 
boom and bust cycles should not occur in such a constant series of repetition. However, in 
some regards it could question if the market was re-adjusting to technological improvements 
or mass land privatization, all of which would affect the prices for land tied to loans or even 
the value of business investments. 
 Overall, the Scottish experiment demonstrated that the market was capable of 
remaining active for over 150 years, while engaging in stability for a long period until after 
the union with England. In the Scottish case, it demonstrates that the market‟s stability 
compared to the English system was far superior. The question of lacking a state stake in two 
banks would have helped to add to the clarity of the system and even help to analyze if the 
market was truly the creator of a crisis. The case would be reinforced if the state did not have 
such an interventionist stake in the market and permitted the market to allow unfettered 
currencies. 
6.0 Conclusion 
 Throughout the research the idea of verifying if central banks and the general 
government monopoly over currency was due to political opportunism or economic necessity, 
by generally comparing between the free banking era and the central banking era of 5 
countries. The research has been drastically analyzed by using three diverse tools. The 
analysis was first considered with bond yields to see any correlation between government debt 
and the reduction in rates once the central bank gained a monopoly. The second consideration 
was to verify the central bank acts and verify if there were any specific legislative directives 
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or argument in favor of preventing a previous economic crisis. And the final consideration 
was given to the historical stability of the free banking period. 
 The research demonstrated that there were multiple methods of interpreting economic 
activities, by analyzing their political aspects and the definition of money by different schools 
of thought. The further schools of thought were demonstrated in different periods of time as a 
guiding factor for politicians. 
 In the research, it was apparent that bond yields, except in the lack of data for 
Scotland, demonstrated an ever growing public debt as bond yields dropped significantly 
under the era of government monopolies. When free banking eras were compared to the 
central banking era, it became ever apparent that under the market era, private banks would 
not lend to government at such low rates due to the irresponsibility and high premium that 
would be required, in which the data demonstrates that reasonably a politician could seek to 
gain a monopoly in hope of financing large government expenditures at a lower interest and 
encouraging individuals to justify this to the electorate as a small cost, when in reality, debts 
have continued to increase since the monopolization of currencies. 
 The analysis of central bank acts revealed different ideas for each central bank, often 
not describing any true necessity or reasoning for any historical problem which would have 
motivated the central banks creation. The diversity of central bank goals can be summarized 
as having a more independent and ultimate power best in the Swedish Riksbank, while having 
a more broad objective set of goals at the Reserve Bank of Australia. The Swiss National 
Bank was clearly laid out to ensure a very independent operation, while following a general 
pattern of simply ensuring a stable currency and a responsible market acceptance of Swiss 
Francs. The Federal Reserve allowed far more selective powers, in which it described 
different rates and other set of goals which it was to achieve, while also being bound at the 
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beginning of its existence with a gold standard. In which the final bank, in the case of 
Scotland, was the transition from private banks towards the later Bank of England under the 
union, as with the Bank of England demonstrated its creation was due to the monarch‟s desire 
to fund wars. 
 The analysis of stability from a historical perspective demonstrated that different 
causes for the economic crises that were often before the introduction of the central bank act, 
however, in almost all cases, an excess of government intervention has been seen and 
arguably believe to have precipitated risky processes at private banks. As in the case of 
Australia which the crash was due to a retraction of foreign money and thus the resulting fall 
in land prices which was further precipitated by government intervention such as mandatory 
bank holidays by the governor. The Swiss case was primarily based on a problem of clearing 
houses, in which the Swiss National Bank was, create to fulfill, although the market could 
have reasonably created such an institution. The United States system was generally stable, 
although in certain state the limitations imposed by state legislatures was often pro-
inflationary and lacked the freedom for private banks to protect the liabilities to their 
depositors. The Scottish case was filled with government intervention, while not protecting 
the basic economic necessity of property rights and thus resulted in a constant boom and bust 
cycle of neglecting notes. The final Swedish central bank came about as a government 
project, since stability was extremely common, as only one bank failed due to corruption 
which did not result in any losses for the depositors. 
 The question over opportunism or economic necessity can be finalized with a general 
swing to opportunism. Despite politicians perhaps did plan to implement a central bank to 
lower bond yields as the data could arguably be an after-effect which was discovered. The 
view of central bank legislation and economic history of stability clearly demonstrate a 
pattern in which political decisions often were the result of the legislature, as in the New York 
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case demonstrate a great fatigue with corporate powers and government legislation which 
benefits such well-connected individuals. The following research still leaves open the 
questions to be answered about micro-aspects of the diverse periods and specific political 
moves which may never be answered, but nonetheless, a clear pattern has emerged to 
demonstrate the true lack of knowledge of politicians to conduct monetary policy and their 



















Throughout history, at multiple times, countries have implemented central banking systems 
by monopolizing currencies.  The following study looks at key indicators such as bond yields, 
central bank legislation and free banking era legislation to identify whether changes were due 
to economic necessity or political opportunism on the part of politicians. The study will 
analyze 5 countries, most notably Australia, Sweden, Switzerland, United States and 
Scotland, all of which have had a free banking period and can shed some light on the topic of 
transition from a free banking system to a centralized monopoly. The comparison draws light 
on the diverse problems and challenges that arose, most notably finding that in the majority of 
cases, government intervention caused the banking system to become unstable and help 
governments to engage in large debt financing under the central banking era. 
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V průběhu historie v různých časech, země zavedly centrální bankovní systémy, které si 
přivlastňují měn.Následující studie se zaměřuje na klíčové ukazatele, jako jsou výnosy 
dluhopisů, centrální banky právních předpisů a zákonů z éry svobodného bankovnictví určit, 
zda změny byly kvůli ekonomické nutnosti nebo politického oportunismu ze strany 
politiků.Studie analyzuje 5 zemí, zejména z Austrálie, Švédsko, Švýcarsko, Spojené státy 
americké a ve Skotsku, z nichž všechny mají volnou bankovní období a může vrhnout trochu 
světla na téma přechodu z volného bankovního systému na centrální monopolu.Srovnání 
vychází světlo na různých problémů a výzev, které vznikly, zejména zjištění, že ve většině 
případů, vládní intervence způsobila bankovního systému, aby se stala nestabilní a pomoc 
vládám, aby se zapojily do značné dluhové financování v rámci centrálního bankovnictví éry.  
 
Klíčová slova: bankovnictví; rent-seeking, Komparativní bankovní systémy, centrální banky, 
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